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Introduction

In How the West Came to Rule (HWCR) we conclude with a call for ‘readers to address, research and fill out… the gaps made evident in this study… as there remains a great deal more to say’ (278). We are flattered and privileged that in this symposium our call has been taken up with such enthusiasm and sincerity by our colleagues Gurminder Bhambra, Ayse Zarakol, Eren Duzgun, Eric Mielants and David Blaney and Nayeem Inayatullah. In particular, we are grateful for the care and patience with which our arguments have been read, as well as the force of the criticisms posed. As with all good critical engagements, the pieces in this symposium are demanding. They have pushed us to clarify or refine our arguments and in some cases compelled us to revise them. Where we have disagreed with our critics, their criticisms have offered us the opportunity to develop responses and clarifications that we would have been unable to do otherwise. It is in this spirit of productive engagement set by our interlocutors that we reply.

We also acknowledge that what follows is by no means an ‘end’ to the dialogue. Our critics have provided food for thought beyond what we have been able to squeeze into a single reply piece. Our response therefore focuses on three themes that collectively frame our critics interventions. In the first section, we respond to Inayatullah’s and Blaney’s searching interrogation of what is logically constitutive of capitalism and what is historically constitutive of capitalism. They argue that we collapse the two meanings of constitutive; we respond by suggesting such a ‘collapsing’ may not be all that harmful.

The tensions Inayatullah and Blaney draw out between the ‘being’ of capitalism and its ‘becoming’ sets the stage for an exploration of the remaining themes of this symposium – our definition of capitalism and what is at stake in anti-Eurocentric theorising and history-writing. In the second section, we respond to our critics’ objection with how we conceptualise, define or theorise capitalism. As we will see, Duzgun, Mielants, Zarakol and Bhambra all find problems in the way our definition of capitalism informs our historical analysis. In this section, we defend the ‘more expansive’ conception of capitalism originally developed in HWCR and
demonstrate how such a definition avoids the sort of homogenisation of capitalism that might naturalise it.

In the third section, we examine our critics’ charge that HWCR does not successfully challenge Eurocentrism but in certain ways reproduces it. Here we insist that anti-Eurocentric analysis must fight (some of) its battles on the terrain of Europe itself, and defend the idea that anti-Eurocentric approaches can and should take Europe as their object of study and critique.

The Logic of History

Inayatullah and Blaney identify a potential tension that exists between our criticism of the internalist method in Eurocentrism and our criticism of Political Marxist definitions of capitalism. They show how our former line of criticism is historical and focuses on questioning the limited geographical scope of historical analysis. In contrast, the latter line is categorical and concerned with the definition or theorisation of capitalism’s specificity. Inayatullah and Blaney suggest that we do not sufficiently separate these two lines of investigation – we even conflate the two – and as a consequence we muddy the issue of what constitutes capitalism.

Inayatullah and Blaney find that we waver between two positions: between what is historically constitutive of capitalism and logically constitutive, between what is the geography and history of capitalism and what is categorical, between the becoming and being of capitalism. The issue is largely about necessity – what is necessary for capitalism to exist? For example, they write ‘we do not need a non-Eurocentric story of capitalist development to raise the categorical issue about capitalist social relations and non-waged work, forced labour, patriarchy and racism: these are present in the narrow space of the West and can be accessed without much of a sense of capitalism’s history beyond the present’ (Inayatullah and Blaney 2016: 42).

We would respond to this by noting that an apprehension of their presence is not all that is at stake. It might be argued for example that it is indeed possible to theorise racism from the perspective of Europe alone – Foucault (2003) famously did so. However, as others have highlighted, abstracting from the experiences of those in the Global South in the making of racism tends to generate a one-sided and impoverished conception of what racism is (Weheliye 2014). And as numerous critics of Western or white feminism have shown, particular conceptions of feminism masquerading as universal tend to generate new racialised and gendered hierarchies and practices of oppression (Mohanty 2003; Puar 2007).
In both of these examples, the spatio-historical unevenness of these forms—racism, patriarchy—and their combination are absolutely central to what they are. Once we take this claim seriously it becomes difficult to talk categorically about any of these phenomena from an exclusively Western or European standpoint. Each of these examples also demonstrate Eurocentric modes of theorising make limited categorical claims precisely because of their limited empirical scope. Or put differently, the limit points—the inaccuracies and violences—of Eurocentric categorical claims become evident as soon as these categories leave the domain of their own empirical or historical referent.

Our claim about Eurocentrism is therefore not just a spatial one. It identifies disciplining practices which enable or delimit ways of thinking about categories (such as capitalism). For instance, the very spatial externalisation of unfree labour from Europe has been central to the myth that capitalism is categorically a system based on the exploitation of ‘free’ wage-labour.

Indeed, one of the interlocutors for Blaney and Inayatullah’s discussion and one of the biggest propagators of this myth—Ellen Meiksins Wood—apprehends racism and patriarchy in the presence of capitalism but denies their constitutive character—‘for her, only class counts as constitutive—the other oppressions are important but correlative’ (Blaney and Inayatullah 2016: 49). In this respect, Wood’s version of what is constitutive ‘has less to do with history and more to do with logical necessity’. For Wood, capitalism can do without racism or sexism and is even indifferent to such identities; in contrast, capitalism cannot do without class—it is only class that is therefore logically and structurally necessary.

The issue we take with Wood is that this logical and structural necessity—the being of capitalism—is only conceivable through a formal abstraction of capitalism as a system based on market dependence and wage-labour. The very identification of being and what capitalism is involves the centring of this logical and structural necessity (class) by abstracting from practices that might call this centre into question. In a discussion of structuralism and structurationism, Roxanne Lynn Doty outlines the disciplining, marginalisation and violence involved in producing this centre:

for any determination (of meaning or of what constitutes a structure) to take place, the play of differences must be limited and made systematically intelligible... all structures contain a center that organises and makes them coherent, and that both makes possible and limits the play of differences... all structures have a center (a generative logic, an organising principle) that both enables and limits practices. The goal of analyses for structuralists and
structurationists is to discover what this center, this generative logic is, and thereby what structures do by virtue of what they inherently are... The centre is effected through disciplining practice which marginalise all that would call into question its self-evident quality. Further the centre is always in the process of being effected. It is never finally fixed as pure presence... Because any system or structure of meaning exists at the expense of alternative possibilities, its construction involves practices that silence or marginalise those alternatives (Doty 1997: 378).

In HWCR we show how Eurocentrism – a specific claim about Europe as the geographical or spatial container of history – has been an especially pervasive ‘disciplining practice’ in the theorising, centring and structuring the category of capitalism. Specifically, Eurocentrism has been the act or practice through which histories of unfree labour, enslavement, colonialism, racism and so on have been rendered marginal to the self-evident quality of capitalism (either as transhistorical and natural, or as a system formally and exhaustively defined by a particular form of exploitation – ‘free’ wage-labour).

The very possibility of a Eurocentric conception of capitalism is predicated on an a priori exclusion of the non-European and is logically constituted by – ‘is not conceivable without’ – this exclusion. In this respect, Eurocentrism is not just a spatial claim but a categorical one where the exclusion of non-European societies is itself constitutive of the categories generated by Eurocentric historical sociology. Seen in this light, we would push back against the claim that our account conflates the spatial and the categorical – it is more that the geopolitics of Eurocentrism acts as a disciplining practice that is generative of capitalism as a category.

So for us, what is really at stake is the denaturalisation of these categories through an interrogation of how they have come to be accessible or apprehended in our present: that is, the history behind them. With this shift in focus, the character of this ‘access’ or apprehension – either in terms of positionality, geographical scope or empirical focus – becomes absolutely crucial. To lean on an oft-cited line by Friedrich Nietzsche: ‘There is no “being” behind doing, effecting, becoming; the doer is merely a fiction added to the deed – the deed is everything’ (Nietzsche 1969: 45; see also Butler 1990: 25). Our response to Blaney and Inayatullah’s searching interrogation is therefore simple but hopefully not banal: there is no being of capitalism independent of its becoming. There is no logic to capitalism independent of its history. There are no categories of capitalism that operate independent of a spatio-historical setting (or the interconnections between these settings).5

That Political Marxists such as Ellen Wood would seek to construct such a strict division between what is categorically and historically constitutive of

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capitalism, between capitalism's abstract logic of being and historical process of becoming, is on the surface of things quite paradoxical given Wood and other Political Marxists celebration of E.P. Thompson's influence on their work. 6 Thompson's critique of Althusserian structuralism has been a key point of reference for Wood (2002), and she makes much use of Thompson's notion of capitalism holding a distinctive 'logic of process'. Yet Thompson's concept of a 'logic of process' was formulated precisely to overcome the dualisms between theory and history, logic and process, and being and becoming he detected in Althusser's overly structuralist, ahistorical rendition of historical materialism. The problem of Althusser's structuralism, as Thompson explains (1978: 113), was the necessary denial of any conception of history as process, as open-ended and indeterminate eventuation - but not for that reason devoid of rational logic or of determining pressures - in which categories are defined in particular contexts but are continuously 'undergoing historical redefinition, and whose structure is not pre-given but protean, continually changing in form and in articulation ...

By contrast, for Thompson the starting point for any proper theoretical conception of capitalism was not to envision it in terms of some ideal-type structure - to abstract logic from history - but as one of 'structured process' (1978: 137). Thus, in order to overcome the 'freezing' of history entailed in Althusser's 'closed system' of theoretical knowledge holding only the most tenuous relation to the 'real history' of capitalism, Thompson introduces the idea of a 'logic of process' particular to capitalism. For any social system's 'logic of process can only be described in terms of historical analysis' and "history" may only be theorised in terms of its own properties" (Thompson 1978: 114). Through this move, the connections between history and theory as both processes in and of themselves may be brought into a more productive and co-constitutive relationship; a means to reflect upon the spatio-historical character and context of theory, and interrogate the theoretical presuppositions of producing historical knowledge itself. This too requires we dispense with any hypostatisation or privileging of our abstract theoretical conceptions of capitalism's being over its historical process of becoming, for

Those propositions of historical materialism which bear upon the relation between social being and social consciousness, upon the relations of production and their determinations, upon modes of exploitation, class struggle, ideology, or upon capitalist social and economic formations, are (at one pole of their 'dialogue') derived from the observation of historical eventuation over time. This observation is not of discrete facts seriatim but of sets of facts with their own regularities: of the repetition of certain kinds of event: of the congruence of certain kinds of behaviour within differing contexts: in short, of the evidences of systematic social formations and of a common logic of process. Such historical theories as arise (not of themselves, but, at the other pole of the dialogue, by arduous conceptualisation) cannot be tested, as is often supposed, by calling a
halt to process, 'freezing' history, and taking a static geological section, which will show capitalism or class hierarchies at any given moment of time as an elaborated structure. In investigating history we are not flicking through a series of 'stills', each of which shows us a moment of social time transfixed into a single eternal pose: for each one of these 'stills' is not only a moment of being but also a moment of becoming [emphasis added]: and even within each seemingly-static section there will be found contradictions and liaisons, dominant and subordinate elements, declining or ascending energies (Thompson 1978: 63-64).

Once removed from the method of ‘freezing’ or abstracting from history as the path to proper theory the question then becomes what histories do we look at?

We would suggest that in emphasising the becoming of capitalism we can see how its being – its centre – is constantly disturbed from beyond its own margins. Hence, one of the main arguments in HWCR is that this disturbance has (a) historically come from and (b) is most evident in non-European societies, the ‘margins’ of Europe at the limit point of Europe, beyond the border of Europe (categorically and geographically). It is here that we can see the way in which unfree labour and related forms of social control rooted in racism, patriarchy and colonial coercion impinge upon and actively (re)create the conditions of possibility for ‘free’ wage-labour. In this regard, these forms are constitutive in a logical sense – capitalism cannot dispense with them.7

We show this in HWCR with our discussion of the simple and expanded reproduction of capital. We suggest that an exclusive focus on the ‘being’ of capitalism leads us to a narrow historicisation of the ‘simple reproduction of capital’: that is, ‘market dependence’ and the continual need for workers to sell their labour-power in exchange for a wage. This is the story of the English countryside, the enclosures and agrarian capitalism. But for Marx, capital was also logically constituted by the ‘expanded reproduction of capital’. This pointed to a vast sphere of activity that enables and sustains such market dependence, in particular when ‘simple reproduction’ reaches its limits. Specifically, we argue that the expanded reproduction of capital identifies processes that account for the absorption of surpluses created by capital accumulation, either in the form of capital investments or surplus populations shed from production by technological developments. To be clear, our claim is not that simple reproduction and expanded reproduction are distinct historical stages that follow one another. But, rather, that both are constitutive components in the functioning of capitalism itself.

A historical investigation of what expanded reproduction is in practice demonstrates this broader field of practices and social relations that are irreducible to ‘free’ wage-labour but fundamental to its making. For example, England's
capitalism was dependent on the widened sphere of activity offered by the Atlantic; it was only through the sociological combination of American land, African slave labour and English capital that the limits of English agrarian capitalism were eventually surmounted. Similarly, proto-capitalist enterprises in the Low Countries were stifled by the relatively low supply of labour at home which was only overcome by tapping into a vast well of labour in Southeast Asia. There, the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC: Dutch East India Company) created a commercial network that combined uneven labour processes spanning the spice-producing islands in Indonesia, precious metal production in Japan and China, and textile workers in India into a single integrated network of ‘global’ production. It was through these intersocietal interactions that the VOC were able to integrate a disparate yet large mass of labour-power into their own operations. The development and ultimate survival of the institutional innovations central to the development of capitalism in Holland – the Bourse, the Amsterdam entrepôt and the VOC – were thus all founded on this subjugated and exploited mass of unfree Asian labour-power. Had it not been for the expanded reproduction of Dutch and English capitalism through colonial expansion, force and war, their capitalist development would have been unsustainable in ways other ‘antediluvian’ forms of capital were.

**Defining Capitalism**

It is also for this reason that we would push back against Bhambra's claim that non-European societies do not change the way we think about capitalism. As we repeatedly emphasise, this spatial decentring of capitalism also necessitates a categorical decentring of the capital relation. As discussed elsewhere (Anievas and Nisanciouglu 2016a), one of the primary concerns of HWCR was to demonstrate how a geographically decentred history of the origins of capitalism also decentres the singular emphasis or priority given to the capital-labour relation in other Marxist approaches (for example, Political Marxism).

That being said, in no way did we want to throw the baby out with the bathwater; an understanding of how the capital-labour relation operates is of course ‘central’ (in the sense of being important) to understanding the operation of the capitalist mode of production. But to properly understand the operation of the capital-labour relation we need to look beyond the immediate form of exploitation and beyond those social relations reducible to it. To say that racism, patriarchy and state violence are crucial to the operation of the capital-labour relation (but not reducible to it) at once decentres that relation but also provides a fuller explication of its operation. The upshot of such an approach is to necessarily examine how various, seemingly disparate, social processes structurally relate to one another in
the making and reproduction of capitalism; it is to move beyond any approach that aims to establish or privilege one social relation as the sole historical or political prime mover. In these ways, we sought to identify ways in which theories of capitalism can be disturbed by and opened up to questions, experiences, social relations and processes situated outside the confines of Europe. We do however acknowledge that the alternative theorisation we offer in the book is far from complete and insist that we stand at the beginning rather than the end of such a project.

It is important therefore to note that the definition of capitalism provided in the book was not, as Bhambra suggests, the original definition we took as ‘our starting point’ of analysis. Rather, a central ‘finding’ of HWCR was that the working definition of capitalism we had at the outset of writing the book proved problematic in capturing the multiplicity of variegated processes and relations that we came to see as integral to the emergence of capitalism. Fortunately, the readers do not have to take our word for this, as our original definition of capitalism can be found in the article that set us on the path to writing HWCR. In that article, we defined capitalism as ‘a distinctive mode of production characterised by the systemisation of competitive accumulation primarily based on the exploitation of wage-labour’ (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2013: 82fn24). Such a definition, we felt, had the benefit of stressing both the vertical (capital-labour) and horizontal (inter-capitalist) dimension of the capitalist mode of production, rather than privileging one relation over the other.

Yet as our research progressed we realised that while such a definition was not necessarily incorrect, it was nonetheless incomplete. Quite simply, the history we were confronting and grappling with was pointing towards a more complex understanding of both how capitalism came into being, and what were in turn the continuing conditions for its reproduction. It was in particular the engagement with the intersocietal dimensions of capitalism’s emergence and reproduction – a history that we argue is unintelligible without a proper reckoning with the ‘connected histories’ (to use Bhambra’s preferred analytic) between Europe and the non-West – that, in the end, led us to fundamentally revise our conception (and thus theory) of capitalism.

We therefore came to redefine capitalism as encompassing more than the kind of ideal-type conceptions of capitalism as constituted by the capital and wage-labour relation that figures so prominently in many traditional Marxist accounts. Instead, we argue that capitalism is best understood as entailing a wider set of configurations or assemblages of social relations and processes that are systematically geared toward the reproduction of the capital-labour relation, but not
reducible – either historically or logically – to that relation alone (HWCR: 9). As should be apparent, this redefinition of capitalism entails precisely the kinds of ‘unequal power hierarchies’ incorporating racialised, gendered and sexual forms of oppression and control that Mielants calls for.9

Much then hangs on exactly how one defines capitalism, and this is a key line of division and critique among our interlocutors. If Bhambra criticises us for holding a Eurocentric conception of capitalism, Duzgun takes us to task for providing a ‘transhistorical’ conception of capitalism that renders ‘every past event into a necessary “precondition” for the rise of capitalism’ (Duzgun 2016: 11). Here we find the typical Political Marxist critique of the neo-Smithian model of economic development – that we assume what in fact needs to be explained: a distinctive ‘market rationality’, what Wood understands as the circumstances and conditions by which producers become subjected to ‘market imperatives’ (Wood 2002: 50; see Duzgun 2016: 12).

The problem here is that this critique is only applicable if we subscribed to the commercialisation model which views the expansion and intensification of trade, markets and exchange relations as the fundamental drivers of capitalist development. Yet we do not hold such a view, and Duzgun seems to have fundamentally misunderstood our explanatory logic of how capitalism develops, imputing to us a ‘transhistorical motive to improve productive forces’ which we assume but do not explain. For only ‘when one assumes a necessary connection between commercial, demographic, technological factors on the one hand, and capitalism on the other, can international factors be deemed “determinant” of and “preconditions” for the transition to capitalism’ (Duzgun 2016: 11).

Yet Duzgun’s continual reference to our view of a ‘transhistorical compulsion to improve productive forces’ seems to conflate two distinct claims: (1) that agents in pre-capitalist societies can and have developed the productive forces in ways increasing the overall social productivity of labour, and; (2) that one can posit a transhistorical imperative to develop the productive forces and agents will do so irrespective of time and space. Duzgun’s argument rests on the claim that our theory assumes the latter, but nowhere does he substantiate this assertion with any textual evidence. This is because do we do not make this claim nor does the theory of uneven and combined development presume such a transhistorical logic of developing the productive forces. The only claim we make in the book on the status of the productive forces in history (and by extension theory) regards point 1 that agents can and have developed the productive forces prior to capitalism and, secondly, that societies can and have absorbed more advanced productive forces through intersocietal exchanges. If Duzgun would like to dispute these historical
claims and demonstrate their potential problems for theory, then we invite him to do so. But to impute that we are making a transhistorical argument is inaccurate.

Fitting our analysis into this imagined ‘transhistorical’ framework, Duzgun makes much of our use of the term ‘preconditions’ in our analysis of the effects of the *Pax Mongolica* on the breakdown of serfdom in Western Europe during the Long 13th Century. There we argued that the Mongol Empire’s establishment of favourable geopolitical conditions for the ‘extensive development of market relations, trade, urban growth, and perhaps most importantly an increasingly complex division of labour in Western Europe’ were ‘preconditions’ for a later capitalist development (*HWCR*: 75, quoted by Duzgun 2016: 11). Yet nowhere do we claim that these factors *in and of themselves* – i.e. considered in isolation from the other institutional and social processes of transformation we examine – could or would have led to capitalism nor that these factors taken in isolation have any necessary relation to the development of capitalism (see also Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2016b). Indeed, we explicitly and repeatedly warn against taking a theoretical approach that would assume any such necessary connection. For example, we approvingly reiterate Robert Brenner’s original critique of Wallerstein’s ‘commercialisation model’ writing that ‘[w]hile the intensification of urban growth, trade and markets throughout Europe in the early modern era could act as “preconditions” for the eventual development of capitalism, such developments, taken on their own, were incapable of engendering the transition to capitalism, as cities and markets were not by “nature or even tendentially capitalist” (*HWCR*: 21).

Does then the use of the notion of ‘preconditions’ necessarily imply teleologically projecting back in time a historically specific capitalist ‘logic of action’ assuming precisely what needs to be explained? Hardly not. For in the very footnote accompanying the above passage on the effects of the Mongol Empire that Duzgun points to as ‘evidence’ of what he terms (following Karl Polanyi) the ‘economistic fallacy’, we point out that even the strongest critics of the ‘commercialisation model’ agree that the ‘cities, trade and markets which had evolved throughout Europe were a pre-condition for the development of English capitalism’ as Wood herself does in describing Brenner’s analysis of the origins of capitalism. Yet, as we go on, the point is that ‘these developments in themselves could not act in engendering the emergence of capitalism’ (*HWCR*: 307fn92, emphasis added).

In fact, if anyone can be accused of falling into the ‘economistic fallacy’ trap it is Duzgun who appears to conflate Polanyi’s conception of ‘institutionalised markets’ with capitalism as such. As Duzgun puts it (2016: 12),
no matter how widespread the transhistorical indicators of capitalism were, all
transitions to capitalism presuppose the establishment of what Polanyi calls
‘institutionalized markets’ to compel and induce economic action driven by a
distinctive market rationality. Put differently, Anievas and Nişancıoğlu fail to
recognize that what is critical to the transition to capitalism is not the
existence of wage labor, private property or dispossession per se (suggesting
otherwise would simply collapse capitalism’s consequences into its causes),
but the generalization of a form of social relationship that is subsumed to the
operation of the ‘law of value’.

There are two points of particular relevance here. Firstly, ‘institutionalised
markets’11 – meaning ‘self-regulating markets…governed by seemingly impersonal
signals of demand and supply’ in which ‘“land and food were mobilized and labor
was turned into a commodity free to be purchased in the market”’ (Duzgun 2016: 9
in part quoting Polanyi) – are not enough to account for the presence of capitalism.
Institutionalised commodity, land and labour markets existed throughout much of
Europe from around the beginning of the 10th century. And, as recent research
shows, price movements in these markets did reflect ‘demand and supply
conditions fairly quickly’ (Persson 2014: 227). Hence, Duzgun essentially
reproduces Polanyi’s ‘primitivist’ conception of pre-modern societies which
dramatically underestimates the role markets played in organising such societies
(see e.g. Meikle 2010; Bresson 2015; Dale 2016).

The underlying problem here perhaps lies with the fact that Polanyi never
provided a fully worked-out theory of capitalism as such (Dale 2016), but rather
spoke in terms of ‘market society’ that he viewed as only having emerged in 19th
century Europe (Polanyi 1957). Conflating capitalism with ‘market society’ thereby
risks falling into the kinds of idealised conceptions of capitalism associated with
neo-classical economics. Indeed, Polanyi himself was somewhat ambiguous on the
matter writing, for example, that the ‘self-regulating market’ was an ‘inherent
impossibility – it is a utopia’, the market economy being ‘more of an ideology than
an actual fact’ as ‘the separation of economics and politics was never carried
completely into effect’ (Polanyi as quoted in Dale 2016).12

That Duzgun would hold up early modern France as the exemplar of a non-
capitalist society based on Polanyi’s notion of institutionalised markets also appears
rather strange given the vibrant and extensive market relations in pre-revolutionary
France which can be certainly characterised as operating according to an
‘institutionalized supply-demand price mechanism’ (Polanyi 1957: 34; see e.g.
Hoffmann 1996; Heller 2009; Sewell 2010; Horn 2015). Either way, rather than re-
debate whether or not early modern France was capitalist,13 Duzgun’s key claim
(2016: 13) is that our ‘uncritical assimilation of absolutist France into “capitalism”’
ends up ‘obscuring the multilinearity of historical development within Europe itself’. Yet why would conceptualising early modern France as capitalist *logically* result in such an obfuscation of the overall multilinearity of European development? We may pose this question given the extent to which we examine the multilinear developmental trajectories of various European states over the early modern period, particularly focusing on the divergence between the declining feudal Iberian Empires and rising Dutch and English capitalist states. In other words, an empirical disagreement has to whether France was capitalist does not logically entail a unilinear conception of ‘European development’. Moreover, as we argue in the book, the history of capitalism is a multiple, polyvalent one, irreducible to any single form, type or process of transition. In this respect, it makes more sense to talk of *capitalisms* rather than capitalism thereby introducing a certain degree of multilinearity within the history of capitalism itself (HWCR: 9).

Secondly, the operation of the ‘law of value’, according to Marx, does not simply rest on the existence of institutionalised, self-regulating markets, but takes as its necessary presupposition wage-labour. Where else would ‘surplus value’ came from? The derivation of surplus value from the operation of the market – institutionalised or otherwise – would seem to reproduce the fetishism of bourgeois political economy that Marx is at pains to criticise. This is precisely why the ‘market’ or even ‘property’ were not the central explanatory categories of Marx’s thought, and capitalism was not defined in market terms (Davidson 2012).14

Marx is quite clear on this point, claiming for example that capitalist production is distinguished by two ‘characteristic traits’. The first is that commodity production is the ‘dominant’ and ‘determining’ character of production which implies, first and foremost, that ‘labour generally appears as wage-labour’ (Marx 1981: 1019). The second distinguishing feature of the ‘capitalist mode of production is the production of surplus-value as the direct object and determining motive of production’. And this too necessarily implies the existence of wage-labour for

> It is only because labour is presupposed in the form of wage-labour, and the means of production in the form of capital (i.e. only as a result of the specific form of these two essential agents of production), that one part of the value (product) presents itself as surplus-value and this surplus-value presents itself as profit (rent), the gains of the capitalist, as additional available wealth belonging to him (Marx 1981:1021).

This same point is made when Marx discusses the necessity of tracing the violent process of primitive accumulation out of which capital and labour came together and confronted each other as a social relation:
We have seen how money is changed into capital; how surplus-value is made through capital, and how more capital is made through surplus-value. But the accumulation of capital presupposes surplus-value; surplus-value presumes capitalist production; capitalist production presumes the availability of considerable masses of capital and of labour-power in the hands of commodity-producers. The whole movement, therefore, seems to turn around in a never-ending circle, which we can only get out of by assuming a primitive accumulation (the ‘previous accumulation’ of Adam Smith) which precedes capitalist accumulation; an accumulation not the result of the capitalist mode of production but its point of departure (Marx 1976: 873).

Wage-labour is then a necessary presupposition for the existence of capitalism, not its consequence. Arguing otherwise would be to reject Marx’s social theory of value and deny the operation of the law of value, which is exactly what Duzgun is basing his argument upon.

At the same time, to reiterate the above argument regarding capitalism’s ‘preconditions’, we would argue that the existence of wage-labour is also not in itself enough to gauge the existence of capitalism understood as a full-fledged mode of production. The simple reason being that one can point to numerous instances of the extensive use of wage-labour in many parts of the world prior to capitalism (see e.g. Shatzmiller 1997; Banaji 2010; Hofmeester 2012; Persson 2014). For this reason, we argue in HWCR that one needs to make a distinction between capital and capitalism, and that it is only the latter which entails the wholesale transformation and reordering of social relations in the service of the competitive accumulation and reproduction of capital. In these ways, we would argue that our conception of capitalism is much more historicist than those that reduce capitalism to the immediate form of exploitation or ‘institutionalised markets’ as both these phenomena antecedced the emergence of capitalism.

Of course, there is another tradition of thought that provides a more expansive definition of capitalism: World Systems Analysis (WSA). This is the body of thought that Eric Mielants forcefully defends in his critical interrogation of our work. We cannot do justice to all the points raised by Mielants (but see more below) so let us for the moment focus again on the question of defining capitalism which is both implicitly and explicitly central to his critique. Mielants takes issue with our critique of Wallerstein’s account of the transition to capitalism and his conception of it, claiming at various points that we have essentially misunderstood, missed or ignored Wallerstein’s – and other WSA scholars’ – work. Yet in his defense of Wallerstein, Mielants’ demonstrates some of the very problems we identified.

Mielants claims, for example, that WSA scholars conceptualise wage-labour and coerced labour as ‘intrinsically linked’ and that the ‘substantial amounts of
wage labor [that] exists in the core zones of capital accumulation’ do so ‘precisely because of capital’s relation with non-wage labor practices in the periphery’ (Mielants 2016: 32). So far, so good. As Mielants points out in a footnote, we too ‘admit as much’ regarding this necessary relationship between wage-labour in the core and coerced labour in the periphery thereby bringing us ‘quite close to the explanatory theoretical framework in WSA’ (Mielants 2016: 37fn5).

Mielants is quite perplexed that we would make such similar claims to WSA and even occasionally use some of its terminology, such as the notion of a ‘world system’, given our ‘denunciation of WSA’. But here is the key difference between ourselves and WSA that goes to crux of the issue: unlike WSA we do not conceptualise the capitalist ‘world-system’ as a homogenous whole. We do not, in other words, share Wallerstein’s conception of society in the ontologically singular – that once capitalism emerges, it is a world system of a singular type of society (capitalism) which thereby flattens, overlooks and/or annihilates the substantive sociological differences of the various societies making up the world system. Mielants demonstrates the problems of this approach when he writes:

Just as Portugal was a 17th century semi peripheral power which embraced the notion of a mare clausum (p. 233), the Soviet Union in the middle of the 20th century was also in favor of a highly protectionist strategy with more overt governmental intervention. Both were, however, operating within the logic and constraints of the capitalist modern world system (Mielants 2016: 31).

This conception of the relationship between capitalism – which, of course, operates globally – and individual states or societies is predicated upon what we believe is a fundamentally problematic assumption: that the mere incorporation of a society into the capitalist world system automatically renders it capitalism. Or, as Mielants further notes (2016: 37fn4) in regards to the Soviet Union, ‘WSA insisted the “communist” polity was not located outside the capitalist world economy but was an integral part of it, albeit very protectionist’. We might agree that the Soviet state was an ‘integral part’ of the capitalist world economy, but would nonetheless argue that this factor by itself would not make it capitalist.19 It is in this respect that WSA continues to privilege the ‘sphere of circulation’ over production even if, as Mielants correctly points out, Wallerstein and other WSA scholars have certainly paid attention to developments within the productive sphere in Europe.

Similar points have of course been made some time ago by Ernesto Laclau when criticising Andre Gunder Frank’s dependency theory for having ‘constantly confused the two concepts of the capitalist mode of production and participation in a world capitalist economic system!’ (Laclau 1971: 37-38, emphasis original). This is hardly a ‘question of semantics’ as Wallerstein once dismissed it (1974: 392). For
Wallerstein’s attempt to overcome the problem of ‘methodological nationalism’ by scaling up concepts typically used to understand their internal attributes and dynamics (‘capitalism’, ‘division of labour’, ‘core/periphery’, etc.) simply reproduces the problem of the ‘domestic analogy’ on an even larger scale, eliminating what is a constitutive feature of any intersocietal system: interactively-generated difference and hybridity, the interconnected and multilinear character of all development. And, as we show in *HWCR*, the interaction and combination of these different types of social structures is in fact what explains the origins of capitalism and the ‘capitalist world system’ as such. Thus, while Wallerstein is correct to identify the existence of a world system as the overarching structural context in which all societies must operate, this system must be conceptualised as a ‘complex whole, containing multiple modes of production’ (Foster-Carter 1978: 74; see Laclau 1971: 38).

By subsuming societal differences to a singularly-conceived ‘capitalist world-system’ Wallerstein’s WSA thereby fails to overcome the problem of Eurocentrism: all the world is taken to be the functionally differentiated expressions of a singular type of social structure that Wallerstein identifies as having emerged within Europe through uniquely intra-European dynamics. European development is thus conceived as one of self-generation and is in turn taken to be the ‘prime mover’ or ‘core’ of history transmitting its social form throughout the world in a unidirectional West-to-East fashion thereby rendering ‘non-Western’ agency mute in the process.20 This then brings us back to the question of Eurocentrism.

**Europe as an Object of Study**

So far we have primarily focused on how we define capitalism and its consequences for how we read history. However, a second theme or line of criticism is that the anti-Eurocentric approach we propose fails deliver on its promise – if anything it reproduces Eurocentrism. There are three separate lines of criticism here. Firstly, that a truly non-Eurocentric history would have looked at the impact of European societies on non-European ones or the development of capitalism outside of Europe. Secondly, that in not taking non-European countries in themselves (i.e. independently from the study of Europe) we are committing a Eurocentrism of our own kind – studying these societies as subordinated to or instrumentalised in the name of studying Europe. Thirdly, that by including non-European societies in our history of capitalism we are approving or supportive of capitalism in some way.

Let us start with the first criticism. Both Zarakol and Bhambra point to the absence of any discussion of the origins of capitalism outside of Europe which could problematise our focus on Europe. For example, Bhambra taxes us for working with
a methodological assumption ‘that rests on the believed “undeniability” of particular “facts” – namely, that Europe is the origin of particular processes, even if events and peoples in other places provided the conditions for those developments – such that even if it is accepted that “Eurocentrism” is inappropriate as a methodological assumption, the fact of European capitalism cannot be denied’ (Bhambra 2016: 1). Similarly, Zarakol points to various scholars (particularly Randall Collins) who have identified capitalist arrangements in medieval Buddhist China and especially pre-Tokugawa Japan thus demonstrating their ability to have ‘independently developed capitalism before their interactions with European powers’ (Zarakol 2016: 19). While Zarakol remains sceptical as to whether these pre-modern societies can indeed be considered capitalist, she nonetheless poses a very interesting question regarding the hypothetical case of a capitalist pre-Tokugawa Japan:

if it could indeed be shown that capitalism developed independently in island societies facing similar resource and demographic challenges, societies which, for varying reasons, were similarly insulated from the developments in their neighbouring continents, would this not make the emergence of capitalism (if not the expansion of it) one of the rare social phenomena that is more suited to endogenous explanations? (Zarakol 2016: 21).

There are few relevant issues to be raised in properly addressing this question. Firstly, and further relating to Bhambra’s point, is that studies such as those by Collins (1997) that analyse the emergence of various forms of capitalism in pre-modern Asian history – or pre-modern European history, for that matter – typically work with conceptions of capitalism that fall into the ‘economistic fallacy’ highlighted by Duzgun. In other words, they either hold to some variation of the ‘commercialisation model’ of development or (neo-)Weberian conceptions that conflate capitalism with the existence of extensive exchange relations, commodity markets, and private property. They have also tended to equate capitalism with the mere presence of capitalists, while blurring the distinction between simple merchants and industrial capitalists.

The upshot of all this is a precarious engagement with the emergence of capitalism as a social totality. Here again we would re-iterate the decisive importance of distinguishing between ‘antediluvian’ forms of capital that have existed periodically, if sporadically, throughout much of history and capitalism understood as a historical mode of production. Only the latter entails the wholesale transformation and re-ordering of social relations and processes geared toward the systemic reproduction of the capital-wage-labour relation in ways that makes possible the competitive accumulation and expanded reproduction of capital. This is what makes capitalism historically distinct, what constitutes its ‘logic of process’, and what thereby allows us to properly adjudicate its existence. This definition has the advantage of retaining a radically historicist understanding of capitalism while
avoiding the Eurocentric trap of deriving an ideal-type conception of capitalism based on a privileging of European history given that it is precisely the interactions between ‘West’ and ‘East’ that are central to our conceptualisation and theory of it.

Secondly, Zarakol’s argument about capitalism developing ‘independently’ (i.e. endogenously) within pre-Tokugawa Japan rests on a particular assumption about the character of pre-modern Japanese development: that it was relatively isolated or immune from outside influences and pressures. Zarakol writes (2016: 21) that ‘if there is one place in the world that resembles England in its suitability for methodologically internalist analyses, that must be Japan’. The problem here, however, is that this assumption regarding the ‘insulated’ character of Japanese development, like the English case, does not hold.

While it certainly true that the geographical position of the Japanese archipelago placed it at the edge of the ‘China-centred tributary trade system’ (Arrighi 2007: 314) thereby somewhat insulating Japan from an intensive incorporation into that system (Hall 1970: 7), the course of pre-modern Japanese development was nonetheless fundamentally embedded within and impacted by its wider intersocietal context (see Allinson and Anievas 2010b). Unlike Korea, whose common border with China exerted a constant force, Japan was once removed by sea making it ‘almost safe from Chinese or nomadic invasions’ (Lee 2006: 14). At the same time, situated on the geographic frontier of this Sino-centred order, the Japanese developed a ‘high level of cultural life in touch with, but not overwhelmed by, continental influence’ (Hall 1970: 7). Indeed, a persistent feature of Japanese development has been the persistent ability to selectively borrow and innovate upon the intellectual and material conquests of the more ‘advanced’ Chinese civilisation. These ‘cultural’ capabilities of the Japanese were, as Kees van der Pijl argues, characteristic of other imperial frontier societies which were historically distinguished as ‘zone[s] of experimentation and innovation’ operating at the interstices of different imperial centres (Van der Pijl 2007: 76-7, 102-3). From the Chinese, the Japanese adopted philosophical and religious systems (Confucianism and Buddhism), the roots of their written language, administrative and governmental technics, agricultural technologies, styles of art and architecture, among many other socio-cultural traits (Totmann 2004: 31-44).

These cross-cultural flows of ideas, technologies and organisational forms wrought far-reaching transformations in the centuries-long process of early ‘state’ formation in Japan. As in Korea, for example, the adoption of more advanced agricultural techniques from China substantially increased total food supplies thereby permitting increased population growth and social stratification as witnessed much earlier in China (Totman 2004: 40, 44). The pre-modern Japanese social formation can therefore be seen as part of a wider pattern of combined
intersocietal development constituted by the Sino-centred East Asian ‘world system’, cultural order and material division of labour formed no later than the 13th century (Abu-Lughod 1989). This in turn resulted in novel amalgams of socio-political orders and cultural institutions within Japan itself.

In these ways, pre-Tokugawa Japanese development was certainly combined in the sense of being interdependent with the broader ‘structures of social, material and cultural life’ (Rosenberg 2006: 324) making up the 13th century intersocietal system. Our point here regarding these intersocietal dimensions of pre-modern Japanese development echoes one made by Trotsky about the impact of ‘external’ influences on Russian history: ‘It is difficult to say what shape Russian social development would have taken if it had remained isolated and under the influence of inner tendencies only. It is enough to say that this did not happen’ (Trotsky 1962, 170).

Another line of criticism of our non-Eurocentric approach presented by Zarakol and Mielants is that a truly non-Eurocentric approach would have studied Europe’s impact on non-European societies – both point to the Ottoman Empire in particular. Specifically, Mielants suggests that our treatment of the non-West ‘reveals too little about it’ to count as non-Eurocentric knowledge. We would, firstly, draw attention to the various instances in HWCR where we do talk about non-European societies as well as the impact of relations with Europe on them: in our discussion of relations between Europeans and indigenous communities of the Americas; between Europeans and West African kingdoms; between Europeans and South East Asian communities such as the Banda Islands; and between Europeans and the Mughal Empire. For what it’s worth, our prior work has also looked at the impact of Europe on the Ottoman Empire and Tokugawa Japan (Nişancıoğlu 2013; Allinson and Anievas 2010b).

With that said, we would also insist that our object of study (or rather object of critique) remains Europe. Our aim was less to produce knowledge about the ‘non-West’ in and of itself than to produce knowledge about Europe through the incorporation of hitherto marginalised histories outside of Europe’s geographical confines. Here it is important to remember that many histories which have traced the impact of Europe on ‘the Rest’ have themselves been central to the making of Eurocentrism. These histories have often provided a diffusionist model of change that places European societies at the core and non-European societies at the periphery. In such models, the former is presented as the driver of history and the latter as passive recipients of European effects.21
In *HWCR*, we wanted to reverse this relation and this method of history-writing. Rather than offering a discussion of the impact of Europeans elsewhere, we showed how non-European societies were makers of history, and were makers of history on the terrain of Europe itself. This, we believe, not only challenges the view of non-European societies as passive actors but also shows that the internalist model of Eurocentric history-writing – which presents European history as hermetic and endogenous – is flawed. In this respect, our aim was to write – as we have said elsewhere – ‘a non-Eurocentric history of Europe’ (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2016c).

This brings us to the second criticism – that by placing an emphasis on Europe we are succumbing to Eurocentrism. In this view a truly non-Eurocentric history would not talk about Europe but rather provincialise it and avoid ‘subsuming’ it under a European narrative (note already the tension between the first and second line of criticism). But we are more precise in what we mean by Eurocentrism. In *HWCR* we define it as methodological internalism, historical priority and linear developmentalism (4-5). This definition points to a specific set of relations of power constructed through a relationship between European and non-European societies, and forms of knowledge that are grounded in often mythologised histories of Europe (as self-generating, self-propelling and diffusionist). It is specifically this epistemological and methodological framework that we confront and dismantle in *HWCR*.

Moreover, we show that capitalism emerged historically, in practice, through acts of subordination, oppression and exploitation that were conducted by Europeans at the expense of non-Europeans – practices that were themselves constitutive of Eurocentrism. Therefore, to talk effectively about Eurocentrism and tackle it, we consider it necessary to at once shed light on this history and the myths and knowledge produced by, in, and through this history. Insofar as supplanting Eurocentrism involves dismantling the myths constructed of Europe itself, turning away from Europe can only partially achieve this as we suggest in our discussion of Subaltern Studies (*HWCR*: 32-42).

Mielants (2016: 34) in particular questions why ‘capitalism and/or the Industrial Revolution in England remains the primary focus of what actually needs to be explained (albeit by exogenous forces)’. Our response is resounding agreement. We consider the industrial revolution historically significant in the making of capitalism. We also consider it significant in the making of European supremacy. Finally, the notion that it was an endogenously British (or European) creation forms one of the hallmarks of Eurocentrism. So by showing that
exogenous factors were at play is not merely incidental or secondary – it is a fundamental subversion of Eurocentric explanations of European development.

We therefore talk about ‘European capitalism’ in the same way most authors might talk about European colonialism – a global phenomenon but one that was nonetheless enacted by certain groups for the benefit of certain groups over others. Nowhere do we refer to ‘European capitalism’ as either a monolith (i.e. absent internal variations, many different types of capitalism) or as the normative model or benchmark from which to judge all other transitions to and forms of capitalism. Indeed, we continually make the exact opposite arguments. Moreover, to talk about the relations between Global North and South without confronting the specificity of European rule strikes us as one-sided and susceptible to the limitations we identify in Subaltern Studies.

The failure of our critics to recognise ‘Europe’ and ‘European capitalism’ as legitimate objects of anti-Eurocentric criticism also points to a more substantial assumption that uneasily mixes the empirical with the normative. In the third line of criticism, Duzgun (2016: 13) takes us to task for rendering ‘the non-Western world... important only insofar as its “contribution” to the (imagined) origins of capitalism’. It is worth clarifying that we do not think this is the only way of situating the importance of the non-Western world. But in a book about the origins of capitalism, talking about non-Western societies in terms of the origins of capitalism is somewhat unavoidable. Duzgun may have been more satisfied had we also written about non-Western societies’ contribution to other social relations – perhaps conceptions of intimacy, or football, intoxication or kittens, but we unfortunately considered these outside the scope of this project (but future research agendas, for sure).

Nonetheless, Duzgun suggests that we create new spatial hierarchies without actually saying what these hierarchies are or look like. He says such hierarchies are created because we produce ‘deviant’ historical cases but do not name what these are (if anything, we explicitly state that we reject the notion of ‘deviant’ cases – *HWCR*: 49, 56). All of this, he says, rests on an assumption that ‘everyone “equally” conditioned or contributed to the origin of capitalism’ (Duzgun 2016: 13, emphasis original) even though we never make this claim (we, again, make the opposite claim – after all: ‘uneven and combined development’). Finally, even if we did claim that everyone equally contributed to the origins of capitalism, that causal premise (one we do not accept) in no way leads to the normative claim that ‘capitalism represents a superior and better mode of organising human relations’ – this is yet another claim that we never make in the book.
The point is that there is no logical reason why this hypothetical causal premise would lead to a normative claim regarding the ostensibly progressive character of capitalism. In fact, as Inayatullah and Blaney suggest, we hold a decidedly negative view of capitalism; so much so that they criticise us for abandoning Marx’s more complex analysis of the gains of capitalism as being ‘real relative to past social formations’ though nonetheless ‘limited by the organization of capitalism itself’. The point is well taken: of course capitalism led to a ‘process of expanded wealth production’ increasing and differentiating new needs while producing the ‘material capacities that [potentially] satisfy those needs’ (2016: 41). It was for these reasons, among others, that Marx at times viewed capitalism as serving, as Inayatullah and Blaney (2016: 41) note, a very specific ‘historical purpose’: that is, preparing the material conditions and social forces necessary for the overthrow of capitalism and transition to communism. However, if we are to take the multilinear character of historical development seriously, as we sought to do in HWCR, then this historical necessity – and thus the ‘progressive’ nature – of capitalism that Marx identified is illusory. That is to say, once we drop the stagist assumptions of Marxism, there is no reason to believe that communism required the development of capitalism as its necessary pre-condition.

**Conclusion**

We would like to reiterate our gratitude to the contributors for encouraging us to further reflect upon the tensions and omissions of our analysis. We hope that this reply has faithfully confronted these tensions and omissions, resolving some and perhaps defending (or encouraging) others. With regards to the tension between the ‘being’ (logic) and ‘becoming’ (history) of capitalism, we have argued for a historical method that plays on the indeterminacy of this tension. Any attempt to fix a centre that defines the being of capitalism, we argue, is constantly disturbed by practices at its margins, practices and margins that only become visible through an excavation of capitalism’s ‘becoming’. More specifically, we argue that histories that start from the Global South disturb the European centre and Eurocentric mythologies of the origins of capitalism.

We showed that such a disturbance led us to a decidedly anti-Eurocentric definition of capitalism, one that is inclusive of – rather than silent on – these non-European histories. Such a definition we showed is distinct from not only Eurocentric conceptions based on a singular form of exploitation but also from neo-Smithian emphases based on exchange and circulation. In this respect, we reaffirm the need to avoid the pitfalls of homogeneity present in WSA. In contrast, our definition of capitalism avoids a projection of the logic of capitalism transhistorically, but it also does not flatten substantive sociological differences between societies.
So long as we remain attentive to such differences, we must also insist on the specificity of Europe. This is not to privilege or endow it with exceptional internal characteristics. As we have insisted, much of what made Europe distinct or peculiar was rooted in interactions and influences that came from beyond its borders. Moreover, we argue, it is only through confronting Europe on its own ground – by challenging the myths that it was constructed within its own borders – that the cage of Eurocentrism can truly be broken and escaped. While affirmations of non-European ‘Others’ are of course central to this task, we must not forget to also dismantle the European ‘Self’.

As far as we see it, the conception of capitalism and the question of Eurocentrism will likely remain fault lines on which debates around HWCR will – we hope – continue to be waged. Whatever the solutions or answers to these issues (which in the last instance will only really be decided through practice, through struggle, rather than theory) we hope that the terrain or framing of the debate remains intersocietal. As we have seen, neither capitalism nor Eurocentrism can be confronted by starting from the perspective of one, single society. And insofar as our analysis demands a multiplicity of perspectives, we hope for many more voices to join the dialogues initiated by the contributors to this symposium.

Notes

1 For further engagements see Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2016a and 2016b.
2 We would like to also extend our gratitude to the Editor of Spectrum, Faruk Yalvaç, for his support and patience.
3 The dualities Inayatullah and Blaney draw out of our work does much to uncover some of the ambiguities and potential tensions in our project – tensions that we, at times, were conscious of and sought to directly confront, but tensions that we must admit we weren’t aware were as pervasive throughout the whole logic of the book. We must at this stage note our gratitude to Inayatullah and Blaney in bringing these dualities out with such clarity that it offers the opportunity to clarify and refine our position on these questions.
4 After all, racists themselves argue that racial hierarchies are present!
5 This interweaving of being and becoming, logic and history, in defining social forms was what in fact distinguished Marx’s method of abstraction. As Bertell Ollman notes (2003: 116), ‘Things are conceived of, in Marx’s words, “as they are and happen”…so that the process of their becoming is as much a part of what they are as the qualities associated with how they appear and function at this moment’.
6 One the parallels between Althusserian structuralism and Political Marxism, see Davidson (2012: Ch. 18) and Allinson and Anievas (2010a).
7 Take for example Fanon’s (1963: 40) insight that ‘In the colonies the economic substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is the consequence’. The type of ‘slightly stretched’ Marxism that Fanon calls for in understanding the colonial experience is one we try to further develop in understanding the rise of capitalism itself.
We would argue that the reverse is also true – any attempt to theorise racism today without looking at how it relates to the operation of patriarchy or capitalism will be self-limiting.

9 Curiously, Mielants claims (2016: 33) that we do not provide ‘any information or references’ in HWCR on how patriarchy is constitutive of capitalism and that ‘gendered labor relations inherent to the function of a global capitalist economy remain completely unexplored’. We would point the reader to our discussion of the subjugation of women in the Americas through the ‘culture wars’ waged against the Amerindian populations which, as we argued, established a new system of patriarchy that undergirded colonial rule and exploitation, and fed into the origins of capitalism (HWCR: 129-134; see also, 325fn92, 325-26fn101).

10 We define the forces of production as entailing: (1) the means of production including ‘nature itself, the capacity to labour, the skills brought to the process, the tools used, and the techniques with which these tools are set to work’, and; (2) the labour process, ‘the way in which the different means of production are combined in the act of production itself’ (Davidson 2012: 128). As such, the forces of production simultaneously capture both material and social aspects of production, including for example the ways in which tools and technics used in the process of production involve the accumulated collective knowledge necessary to deploy them as genuine productive powers (HWCR: 26).

11 A point of clarification: Polanyi never conceived of ‘institutionalised markets’ as the fundamental presupposition or even indicator of the existence of capitalism as his writings on the institutionalisation of markets in Ancient Greece – which he did not view as capitalist – clearly demonstrates (Polanyi 1977: Part II). Polanyi speaks of the Ancient Greeks as ‘the initiators of all advanced human economy’, who had ‘almost singlehandedly developed both types of economy – the market and exchange type as well as the planning and redistributive type — to their highest form reached up till then’ (Polanyi 1977: 146, 274; see further, Dale 2016: Ch. 9). In Polanyi’s sense of the term, institutionalised markets have existed in many societies and cultures from Ancient Greece and Rome to Sung China (960–1279) and early Medieval Europe (see, inter alia, McNeil 1982; Epstein 2000; Schoenberger 2008).

12 We must thank Gareth Dale for discussing Polanyi’s work with us, and for sharing his personal notes from the Karl Polanyi Archives from which we have taken some of the above quotes.

13 Unfortunately, Duzgun does not engage with the extensive evidence we provide in HWCR in making our case that France can be considered capitalist (see HWCR: 199-213). Suffice it to say that if the establishment of a ‘socio-legal order that systematically enables and compels producers to transform the labour process according to the dictates of capital accumulation’ is, for Duzgun (2016: 12), a hallmark of capitalism, then early post-revolutionary France was certainly capitalist.

14 That Duzgun relies on Polanyi’s conception of ‘market society’ compounds this problem given that Polanyi held to the subjective marginalist theory of value (Dale 2016).

15 As Marx puts it (1977: 214): ‘...capital presupposes wage-labour; wage-labour presupposes capital. They reciprocally condition the existence of each other: They reciprocally bring forth each other’.

16 Duzgun (2016: 11-12) also takes issue with our understanding of capital preceding capitalism, writing that our ‘transhistorical’ conception of capital leads to both an ‘everything-ization’ of the pre-conditions of capitalism’s emergence and an instrumentalization of ‘the “international”, hence the non-Western world, to fill in a preconceived framework of historical change’. But why would pointing to the mere presence of wage-labour in pre-modern times lead to an ahistorical conception of capitalism if the two (capital and capitalism) are viewed as historically and categorically
distinct? Our argument is emphatically not that the presence of the capital-wage-labour relation necessarily leads to capitalism. Indeed, we go to some length in making the exact opposite case in our analysis of how the ‘antediluvian’ forms of capital in the Renaissance Italian city-states proved fleeting and unsustainable (HWCR: 215-222). The point being that one cannot teleologically read back in time any kind of ‘capitalism in the waiting’. Moreover, unless one is to deny the existence of capital-wage-labour relation in the pre-modern era, Duzgun’s argument regarding our ostensible instrumentalisation of ‘the international’ also makes no sense. Alternatively, if Duzgun’s argument is that the capital relation only emerged with the rise of capitalism, then it would be he who is attempting to ‘fit’ history into a ‘preconceived framework of historical change’ given the vast wealth of studies demonstrating the opposite.

17 We thank Mielants for correcting what was, on our part, an improper use of the label ‘World Systems Theory’ to classify this body of thought. From here on we use his formulation.

18 Unfortunately, at times Mielants’ confuses our specific critiques of Wallerstein with more general critiques of WSA as a whole.

19 Of course, whether or not the Soviet Union can be considered capitalist for other reasons is an entirely different matter.

20 Wallerstein (1997: 103) in fact insists that if one focuses ‘too much on non-European agency as a theme, we end up whitewashing all of Europe’s sins, or at least most of them’. Mielants claims that WSA is not guilty of this, suggesting WSA demonstrates extensive accounts of anti-systemic movements. However, the counter-evidence he provides is entirely outside of the 13-18th century timeframe we deploy in the book. It seems then that anti-systemic movements only really emerge as an object of study for WSA after capitalism has been established. In a typical WSA manoeuvre, capitalism is assumed but not explained. It precisely these two features of WSA that we criticise in HWCR. Indeed, our critique of Wallerstein’s WSA was not that he – or other WSA scholars – ignore the non-West in general, but that his (specific) account of the rise of capitalism fails to substantively incorporate the ‘periphery’ as an active, constitutive agent in the process of capitalist development. In other words, the ‘incorporation’ of non-Western societies into the capitalist world-system is conceptualised as a one-way, top-down process rather than a co-constitutive one.

22 To begin with, any explanation that proceeds on the basis of ‘exogenous forces’ is, by definition, not methodologically nationalist. Although we do talk about ‘the peculiar development of the English state’ it is not clear what is problematic about this – after all, no two societies have the same history – given that the claim is rooted in the rejection of stadial explanations that we place at the centre of our theoretical framework: recall Trotsky’s discussion of the ‘peculiarities of Russian history’.

23 There is some debate as to whether the ‘late’ Marx continued to hold such a view (see Stedman Jones 2008; Anderson 2010).

References


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